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Stanley C. Mann, Pro se., 
P. 0. Box 27317 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84127-0317 
Telephone: (801) 278-9460 
IUL I 1988 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
David Mark Newton Wheeler, a minor, 
child, by and through his Guardian 
ad Litem, Mark Wayne Wheeler, 
Plaintiff and Appellee 
vs. 
Stanley C. Mann, 
Defendant and Appellant 
APPELLANT'S OPPOSITION TO 
SUPREME COURT RULING FILED 
June 30, 1988 
Case No. 19730 
Appellant, Stanley c. Mann, submits the following response in 
opposition to the Supreme Court's Ruling handed down on June 30, 1988. 
Appellant alleges the Court erred in holding that appellant: 
1. "Did not assert before Trial Court that the terms of the 
trust instrument entitled him to invest trust monies in, or to lend trust 
monies to, his own companies; nor did he refer to the above quoted 
language." (emphasis added.) 
2. The Court erred in declining to consider the above argument. 
3. The Court erred by ignoring the violation of designation of 
alternate trustee of the trust, set up by Joan Newton Wheeler. 
4. Justice Christine M. Durham erred in not recusing herself 
from participating in the deliberation and Ruling on this matter. 
In support of his position, appellant respectfully shows: 
ARGUMENT 
1.(a) There was never any Trial Court. It was because of 
this that appeal was filed. 
(b) At the one hearing, held on August 18, 1983 in the 
court of Judge J. Dennis Frederick relative to the Partial Summary 
Judgment, the very assertion the Court denies was made, did occur and the 
very same case cited by the Court, was cited by appellant. (Transcript 
of Hearing, August 18, 1983, beginning on Page 27, Line 20 through Page 
28, ending with Line 16) (ADDENDUM No. 1). The Dipo v Dipo case was 
cited in appellant's brief, on Page 16 and in paragraph IX.(g) Page three 
(3) of the will. The very words the Court's findings stated was not 
used, is cited and discussed, on Page 14 and Page 15 of appellant's 
brief, filed May 21, 1984. 
2. No one, who read the brief, or perused the documents, could 
honestly deny the existence of these documents, or hold to their ruling 
to not consider this argument, in light of these documents. 
3. The Court erred in ignoring appellant's argument, under 
Point V. Joan Newton Wheeler named an alternate trustee, in the event 
appellant, Stanley C. Mann could not act. The alternate trustee was Joan 
Newton Wheeler's sister, Gail H. Taylor. Gail Taylor was never contacted 
-2-
or even considered as trustee, as so provided in the Trust, and merely 
because Mr. Wayne Wadsworth's family client did not want her as trustee. 
(Transcript of Hearing, August 18, 1983, Page 37, and Page 38. (ADDENDUM 
No. 1). 
No Court has the right to violate the constitutional rights of 
another and to violate the statutes, relative to a properly drawn and 
executed Will and Trust of another. 
Appellant firmly believes the point was intentionally ignored. 
There is no Statute, Rule or Precedent, which gives any Court of Utah, or 
the U. S., the right to so cancel an individual's rights and void the 
Statutes, duly passed by the Legislature, regarding the rights of 
individuals executing Wills and Trusts. 
4. Judge Christine M. Durham held an ex-parte hearing, at 
which she appointed Mark W. Wheeler Guardian ad Litem of David Newton 
Wheeler. At that hearing, it was alleged appellant, Stanley C. Mann was 
implicated in an attempt to kill Mark Wheeler. This was a totally false 
accusation and known to be false by Mark Wheeler's attorney and 
brother-in-law, H. Wayne Wadsworth. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court Ruling should be reversed, on the basis of the 
obvious errors made in the Findings of Fact, upon which the Court has 
stated it based its Ruling. 
Dated this 8th day of July, 1988. 
Stanley C. Mann, Pro se., 
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NOTICE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
APPELLANT'S OPPOSITION TO SUPREME COURT RULING FILED June 30, 1988, 
Postage Prepaid this 8th day of July, 1988, to: 
Brent V. Manning 
William D. Holyoak 
Attorneys at Law 
Holme, Roberts & Owen 
50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84101 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID MARK WHEELER, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
STANLEY C. MANN, 
DEFENDANT. 
NO. C-79-4063 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, JUDGE 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AUGUST 18, 1983 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT 
PRO SE: 
BRENT V. MANNING 
HOLME, ROBERTS S OWEN 
50 SOUTH MAIN, SUITE 900 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84144 
STANLEY C. MANN 
P. 0. BOX 27 317 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84127 
SUSAN K. HELLBERG, C.S.R 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
, TRUE. I WANT TO READ YOU A COUPLE OF PARAGRAPHS AS I 
STATED, AS LONG AS MR. MANNING GIVES SOME BACKGROUND, I 
j ,vANT TO TELL YOU WHY MY WIFE WAS NAMED IN THAT MURDER 
4 CHARGE, NOT BECAUSE SHE WAS MARRIED TO ME FOR 29 YEARS AND 
WORKED WITH ME IN THE COMPANY, AND THEY KNEW WE WERE VERY 
CLOSE, SHE WAS VERY FAMILIAR IN THAT BECAUSE IT SAYS ON 
PAGE 2 OF THE WILL, I APPOINT STANLEY C. MANN AND LOUISE 
C MANN AS JOINT GUARDIAN OF MY MINOR CHILD AND OF THE 
ESTATE OF MY MINOR CHILD TO SERVE WITHOUT BOND. IN THE 
SUIT THAT MR. WHEELER HAS GOT AGAINST THE AIRLINES FOR 
WRONGFUL DEATH THAT HE FILED AND GOT GOING EVEN THOUGH IT 
SHOULD GO INTO THE TRUST, UNDER THE LAW IT'S MY UNDERSTAND-
ING THAT EVEN IF THEY REMOVE ME, MY WIFE WOULD BE IN CHARGE 
OF THAT ESTATE, AND THAT WAS THE LAST MINUTE, BECAUSE WHEN 
THEY— THEY SAID TO MR. WHEELER, WELL, DO YOU KNOW OF 
ANYTHING THAT IMPLICATES MRS. MANN, AND HE SAID, WELL, 
SHE'S NAMED IN THE WILL, ISN'T SHE? THAT'S WHAT HE SAID 
IN HIS DEPOSITION. THAT'S THE REASON THAT THEY NAMED 
HER. 
NOW, WHEN IT'S TALKING HERE ABOUT POWERS OF 
FIDUCIARIES UNDER NO. 9 IN THE WILL, THE FIDUCIARY SHALL 
HAVE THE POWER TO CONVERT ANY PROPERTY OF BUSINESS INTEREST 
HELD BY THE FIDUCIARY OR IN THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP IF THE 
FIDUCIARY JUDGMENT IS ADVISABLE TO DO SO. I WANT TO GO 
DOWN TO G. THE FIDUCIARY MAY INVEST OR REINVEST FUNDS OR 
27 
t ASSETS AS MAY BE OF PRUDENCE OR DISCRETION. I PUT MORE OF 
MY OWN MONEY INTO THAT COMPANY AFTER TRUST MONEY WENT INTO 
m 
j THAT COMPANY. SO I THINK I FELT IT WAS THERE, AND I PUT 
i SEVEN YEARS OF LABOR FOR NOTHING INTO IT, INTO THIS OWN 
{ 
ACCOUNT, HAVING REGARD NOT TO SPECULATION BUT TO PERMANENT 
DISPOSITION OF THEIR FUNDS AND CONSIDERING A PROBABLE INCOME 
AS WELL AS A PROBABLE SAFETY OF THIS CAPITAL INCLUDING BUT 
NOT BY WAY OF LIMITATION, TRUST FUNDS, SHARES, AND OBLIGA-
TIONS OF THE FIDUCIARY AND ERRORS AND OBLIGATIONS OF ANY 
AFFILIATES OF THE FIDUCIARY, WHETHER OR NOT THE CHARACTER 
OTHERWISE PERMITTED BY THE LAW FOR THE INVESTMENT OF FUNDS 
FOR A FIDUCIARY. 
IT SAYS WHETHER OR NOT IT'S PERMITTED BY LAW, 
AND IF I'M NOT MISTAKEN, THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN 197<+ IN 
DIP VS. DIP SAID THAT THE TERMS OF A TRUST UNLESS A LEGAL 
OR AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY RULE OVER STATUTE. I PUT THAT IN 
THERE BECAUSE MY BISHOP COMES AND SAYS I HAVE TALKED WITH 
THEIR BISHOP. THEY'RE GOING TO TRY AND TWIST THAT WILL 
AROUND AND ADOPT DAVID AND SEE IF THEY CAN GET THAT MONEY. 
DID YOU KNOW THEY ARE GOING TO BREAK THAT TRUST? DID YOU 
KNOW THAT WHEN SHE WAS KILLED BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMPANY 
HAD PAID THE MONEY OUT TO ME, MR. WHEELER HIRED ANOTHER 
EX-BROTHER-IN-LAW, A DAVID YOUNG, HERE IN SALT LAKE, WHO 
WE WILL TALK ABOUT LATER, AND WAS WRITING LETTERS TO THE 
INSURANCE COMPANIES TELLING THEM DON'T PAY OFF TO MR. MANN. 
28 
YOND THE SCOPE OF WHAT THIS COURT IS EXAMINING TODAY. 
MR. MANN: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY MAKE TWO COMMENTS 
NUMBER ONE, I BELIEVE THAT THE STATEMENT IS RELEVANT BE-
CAUSE IT SHOWS THEY INTENTIONALLY DESTROYED THOSE COMPANIES 
BECAUSE THEY KNEW THE TRUST MONEY WAS THERE, THAT IT WAS 
THEIR DOING TO DESTROY THAT AND BLEW UP THE VALUE OF IT 
TO TRY AND SINK THE BONDING COMPANY. THE OTHER POINT THAT 
I WANT TO MAKE, I REALIZE WHAT YOU ARE TELLING ME, BUT I 
STILL SAY AGAIN THE COURT IS VIOLATING JOAN NEWTON 
WHEELER'S RIGHTS, AND I READ FROM HER WILL, PAGE 2, WHERE 
IT SAYS: 
"APPOINTMENT OF FIDUCIARIES, ITEM 
7, I APPOINT STANLEY C. MANN TO 
BE EXECUTOR OF MY WILL AND SERVE 
WITHOUT BOND. IN THE EVENT STANLEY 
C. MANN DIES, DECLINES TO ACT OR 
OTHERWISE DOES NOT SERVE AS EXECUTOR 
OF MY WILL, I APPOINT GAIL H. TAYLOR..." 
AND THAT'S HER OTHER SISTER. 
"...AS EXECUTRIX OF MY WILL TO SERVE 
WITHOUT BOND-." 
I'M SAYING, SEE, I OFFERED TO PUT THIS IN A 
CORPORATE TRUSTEE IF THEY WOULD NOT TRY TO BREAK IT, AND 
THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT THAT. WAY BACK IN 1979, I'M SAYING 
THAT THEY ARE INTENTIONALLY TRYING TO BY-PASS HER WILL 
37 
: AND RIGHTS AGAIN BY BY-PASSING THE SECOND PERSON THAT SHE 
2 NAMED WHO WAS HER SISTER BECAUSE THEY KNOW THAT THEY 
3 .WOULDN'T GET THEIR HANDS ON THAT MONEY EVEN IF GA J L TAYLOR 
t .VAS THERE, AND I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE COURT SHOULD HAVE 
= APPOINTED THE FIRST INTERSTATE BANK EITHER. I THINK THE 
5 COURT SHOULD HAVE APPOINTED GAIL H. TAYLOR. AFTER ALL, 
7 THAT IS WHAT HER WILL AND TRUST SAYS RIGHT HERE, THAT IF 
3 I'M DEAD OR UNABLE TO ACT, I APPOINT GAIL H. TAYLOR, AND 
9 I THINK THAT OUGHT TO BE HER RIGHT. THAT WAS MY SECOND 
;0 POINT. 
i 
I WANT TO JUST MENTION IN SUMMING UP, THE UTAH 11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
21 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 56, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, C, FOUR 
LINES DOWN, JUDGMENT SOUGHT SHALL BE RENDERED FORTHWITH 
IF THE PLEADINGS, THE DEPOSITIONS, THE ANSWERS TO INTERROGA-
TORIES AND ADMISSIONS ON FILE TOGETHER WITH THE AFFIDAVITS, 
IF ANY, SHOWED THAT THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO MATERIAL 
FACT AND THAT THE MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. I'M SAYING THERE IS A MATERIAL ISSUE 
OF WHETHER OR NOT, ACCORDING TO THE SUPREME COURT RULING 
20; OF 7^ IN DEPLOY VS. DEPLOY, WHETHER OR NOT I HAD THE RIGHT 
TO DO THAT. THEY SAID IT SUPERSEDES ANY STATUTE, AND I'M 
22i SAYING THAT A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A DRASTIC ACTION FOR 
23 ' SOMEONE TO TAKE SOMETHING SO COMPLEX AS THIS AND ESPECIALLY 
24 
25 
IF YOU GO ON THE BASIS OF A DOCUMENT THAT YOU COULD NOT 
! EVEN SELL PROBABLY TO A GERMAN MAGAZINE. IT'S GOT THAT 
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